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CASENOTE
PERSECUTION BASED ON PERSECUTION:
HOW GAO V. GONZALES BROADENS THE
INTERPRETATION OF ASYLUM LAW
DAVID BAXTER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Fraught with "widespread domestic violence and trafficking in
brides and prostitutes," 1 China is full of rural areas in which these
activities go unchecked. These conditions are nurtured by political
corruption and social norms that impede the government's ability to
eradicate these practices. 2 These practices have led some Chinese women to seek asylum in the United States. Such was the situation in the
case of Gao v. Gonzales.
The petitioner, Hong Ying Gao, claimed that she was a member of a
group of people subject to persecution, who would not be protected
by their government from such persecution.3 For asylum to be
granted in the United States, a person must prove that he or she will
be persecuted on the basis of "race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion."4 In order for a person to be a member of a "particular social group" and therefore to be
granted asylum, it has been held that a person must share a "common,
immutable characteristic" with other members of that group.5
The scope of "particular social group" was the essential determination made by the court in Gao. This casenote examines the social implications of broadening the "particular social group" category found
in the Immigration and Nationality Act and how those implications
balance with notions of morality and strict interpretation of asylum
1. Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 2006).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (legislation providing
definitions and statutory guidelines for granting asylum to citizens of foreign countries).
5. Gao, 440 F.3d at 67 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (B.I.A. 1985)
(explaining what constitutes membership in a social group and setting out the statutory requirements for asylum and the withholding of deportation)).
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regulations. In defining Gao's group by the persecution being suffered, the court strayed from previously adopted tests.
This note first presents the facts of the case at hand and the judicial
decisions made. The note then examines the state of asylum law as
determined by statute and precedent. Finally, the note points out the
differences that exist between the test the court adopted and the way
it was applied.
II.

THE CASE

When Hong Ying Gao was nineteen years-old, her parents sold her
to a man named Chen Zhi in order to pay off the family's debts. 6 The
agreement was for Gao to marry Zhi, but she later refused.7 Zhi had
a problem with gambling and a habit of beating Gao when she did not
provide money to satisfy his addiction.8 Gao attempted to leave Zhi
by moving an hour away by boat, but Zhi harassed Gao's family in
response. 9 On one occasion, Zhi followed Gao, after she had been
visiting her family, to discover where she was living. 10 Since Zhi's uncle was a political official in Gao's rural village, Gao concluded there
was no way that the government could protect
her from this treat12
ment. 1 Gao relocated to the United States.
Once in the United States, Gao petitioned for withholding of removal and asylum. She also stated a Convention Against Torture
(CAT) claim. a3 Her claim was heard by an immigration judge (IJ)
who denied Gao's withholding of removal and asylum claims based on
his finding that Gao was not a member of a "particular social group"
as required by the Immigration and Nationality Act.1 4 The IJ also
ruled that Gao failed to establish that the Chinese government could
not protect her and that she could not successfully relocate in China. 5
The judge did not give a reason for denying Gao's CAT claim. The
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision.1 6
The case was later appealed to the United States Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. 7 The court applied a de novo standard in review6. Gao, 440 F.3d at 64.
7. Id. at 64.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 65.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (The BIA hears appeals from decisions made by Js because it is the highest administrative agency dealing with immigration issues.).
17. Id. at 65.
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ing questions of law, the application of law, and mixed questions of
law and fact."s With regard to findings of fact, the court applied a
more deferential "substantial evidence" standard.19 Three main issues
were examined:
(1) whether Gao established that she might be forced into marriage
"on account of . . membership in a particular social group"; (2)
whether the IJ had a substantial basis for finding insufficient evidence
that the Chinese authorities would not protect Gao; and (3) whether
the IJ had a substantial basis for finding that Gao could safely relocate
within China.2 °
The court assumed that forced marriage was persecution for the purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act.21
First, the court, citing In re Acosta, found that gender could be a
common characteristic that would form the basis for Gao's membership in a "particular social group., 22 The court also ruled that she
must show a "well-founded fear of persecution," and a nexus between
'' 23 The court
that fear of persecution and the "particular social group.
24
successfully.
elements
these
satisfied
found that Gao
Second, the court ruled on the Chinese government's ability to protect Gao from persecution. 2 5 The court relied on the 2001 State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices in China
(Country Report) and concluded that political corruption and social
norms based on gender imbalance, along with the fact that Zhi
threatened to have Gao imprisoned, were sufficient to show that the
Chinese government could not protect Gao from a forced marriage.26
Finally, the court reasoned that since Gao had attempted to relocate
within China to escape from Zhi, and that Zhi had followed her and
terrorized her family, it was not possible for Gao to relocate within
China to avoid this persecution.2 7 Based on these findings, the court
reversed the decisions of the IJ and the BIA, and remanded the asylum claim, the withholding of removal claim, and the CAT claim.28
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 66.
21. Id. ("The government appears to concede, as it must, that forced marriage is a form of
abuse that rises to the level of persecution.").
22. Id. at 67 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233).
23. Gao, 440 F.3d at 71.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 70.
26. Id. at 71 (referencing U.S. Dep't of St., Country Rep. on Hum. Rts. Prac. (released by
Bureau of Democracy, Hum. Rts., & Lab., Wash. D.C.) (2002) http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2001/eap/8289.htm).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 72.
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BACKGROUND

The development of asylum case law in the United States was significantly impacted by the landmark case In re Acosta.2 9 This BIA decision upheld denial of asylum for a taxi driver from El Salvador. 31 This
decision described the elements, found in the Immigration and Nationality Act, which an alien must satisfy when petitioning for asylum
and the withholding of removal. 31 According to In re Acosta, the petitioner must establish
(1) the alien must have a fear of persecution; (2) the fear must be wellfounded; (3) the persecution must be on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion;
and (4) the alien must be unable or unwilling to return to his country
of nationality or to the country in which he last habitually resided because of persecution or his well-founded fear of persecution.32
The BIA subsequently examined each of these elements and provided
interpretations of each.
The first interpretation the BIA made was the meaning of the word
"fear" as it related to refugees. The BIA stated that fear is, in fact,
"subjective" and is defined as "a genuine apprehension or awareness
of danger in another country. '3 3 The BIA determined that the
amount of fear necessary to satisfy the statute would depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case, but must still satisfy the definition given.34
The second element discussed was the meaning of "well-founded
fear." The BIA held that in order to show a fear is "well-founded,"
there must be objective evidence showing a "likelihood" that a person
will be persecuted if he returned to his home country, or, as the BIA
stated, "If there is a real chance that he will suffer persecution, that is
reason good enough and his 'fear' is 'well-founded.' "3
The third element the court addressed dealt with was causation.
The feared persecution must be "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. "36
Where the test for "well-founded fear" is lax, the test for the cause of
the persecution is strict.3 7 There must be a characteristic shared by
the "particular social group" that "cannot be changed or should not be
29.
30.
31.
(2006)).
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 211.
Id.
Id. at 218-19 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 219 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006)).
In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 211.
Id.
Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 232 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006)).
In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232.
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required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences."" An example of a characteristic which refugees
should not required to change is religion. Refugees suffering from
persecution because they are members of a belief system, which is
"fundamental to their individual identities," should not have to
change their religion to avoid persecution.39
The final element discussed by the BIA in In re Acosta was that
"the alien must be unable or unwilling to return to his country of nationality or to the country in which he last habitually resided because
of persecution or his well-founded fear of persecution." 4 The BIA
stated that the fear of persecution must be based on a threat that is
"country-wide," not just isolated to one area.4 '
In re Acosta stated that, in order to establish an asylum claim, one
must establish that he or she "has a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion '42 In Diallo v. INS, a decision rendered after In re Acosta, the Second Circuit held that the legal test for
a "well-founded fear" is not a strict or narrow one and that fear may
be "well-founded even if there is only a slight, though discernible,
chance of persecution." 43 This lowers the standard established in In re
Acosta.

In Gao, the Second Circuit used three elements, established by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Fatin v. INS, to establish eligibility
for asylum claims based on membership in a "particular social
group. '4 4 The three elements were (1) the person seeking asylum
must show that the "particular social group" exists; (2) that person is a
member of that group; and that (3) there is a "well-founded fear" that
the person will be persecuted because they are a member of that
group. 45 The Gao court applied this three-step process to determine
eligibility under the "particular social group" definition and used the
Fatin decision as an 46instructive in concluding that this term should be
interpreted broadly.

38. Id. at 233.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 235 (citing 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (2006)).
41. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 235
42. Id. at 211 (citing 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (2006)).
43. Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a slight chance of persecution based on race was enough to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution).
44. Gao, 440 F.3d at 67 (citing Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993) (case where an
Iranian woman who lived in Iran before the Islamic revolution failed to show a well-founded
fear of future persecution based solely on her gender when she claimed that subsequent to the
revolution she would have to conform to the ways of the Islamic fundamentalists).
45. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d at 1240.
46. Gao, 440 F.3d at 67, 68.
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First, sex may be a characteristic that constitutes a social group, but
should be determined on a "case-by-case" basis.4 7 The court also reiterated that the characteristic defining membership in that group must
be something that "cannot be changed or should not be required to
change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or
consciences."48
Second, the nexus between membership in the group and the persecution based on that membership is strictly interpreted.4 9 The Gao
court cited Niang v. Gonzales, which stated that social groups should
not be based on gender alone but should be based on the persecution
that membership in that group, due to the main characteristic, would
likely bring.50 Therefore, it is not enough to simply share the same
characteristics as other people, but that shared characteristic must also
be the basis for persecution.5 1 The BIA found such a nexus in In re
Fauziya Kasinga.Here, females of a tribe that practiced female genital
mutilation were considered persecuted based on their membership in
a social group all sharing the characteristic of gender.5 2
Third, the Gao court stated this shared characteristic must be the
basis for the fear of persecution, especially in light of the Second Circuit's interpretation in Gomez v. INS. 53 In that case, the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of a woman's asylum claim because the court
did not see a connection between her numerous rapes and beatings
and any other characteristics that would establish membership in a
particular social group that would be the likely basis for future persecution.54 The court reasoned that a different finding would lead to the
"on account of" language, or the causation required by the Immigration and Nationality Act, to be interpreted too broadly. In proving
future persecution, while the petitioner need only show that there is a
"likelihood of future persecution," the persecution must be based on
membership in the "particular social group. "56
47. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
48. Id.
49. Gao, 440 F.3d at 68.
50. Id. at 68 (citing Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 2005)).
51. Niang, 422 F.3d at 1199-1200..
52. In re Fausiya Kasinga, 2 1. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) (females belonged to a
"particular social group" that were persecuted because they were female members of TchambaKunsuntu Tribe who were opposed to the tribal practices of female genital mutilation.).
53. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (case involving a woman who had been raped
and beaten by guerilla soldiers five times in her home country and whose asylum claim was
rejected due to that fact that the nexus was strictly interpreted and likelihood of future persecution could not be shown).
54. Id. at 663-64.
55. Id. at 664-65.
56. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 224-25 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006)).
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IV.

ANALYSIS

Despite the Second Circuit's holding in Gomez v. INS, the court in
Gao v. Gonzales reversed the decision of the IJ and the BIA and
found Gao eligible for asylum.5 7 In effect, this ruling broadened the
once-strict view of the nexus that must exist between membership in a
"particular social group" and the persecution based on belonging to
that social group." Gao's facts were unique in that membership in the
"particular social group" was also the persecution that the members of
that group faced. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in the
decision that "Gao's social group consists of women who have been
sold into marriage (whether or not that marriage has yet taken place)
and who live in a part of China where forced marriages are considered
valid and enforceable." 5 9 This common characteristic that the women
sold into marriage in rural China shared was precisely the persecution
they wished to avoid.
By comparison, in In re Fauziya Kasinga, the females of the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe, which practiced female genital mutilation,
shared the common characteristic of being females and being members of the tribe that practiced this ritual.6" In Gao's village, the persecuting practice was being sold into marriage with no protection from
the government. This was the only characteristic the women in that
particular social group shared other than being female. A careful distinction can be made here from the females of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu
Tribe, which persecutes all women in the tribe because they are members. Unlike the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe, the members of Gao's village were not all sold into marriage. Therefore, the nexus needed to
satisfy the Fatin test did not exist - and could not possibly exist - because the persecution and the membership characteristic were the
same. Women in rural Chinese villages must have been forced into
marriage before they could become a member of the social group.
The effect of the Gao v. Gonzales decision is that women who are
sold into marriage need not prove the nexus between membership in
the group and persecution due to membership, because the fact that
they are in the group at all shows they have been and will be persecuted. This key result was driven by the government's concession,
which the court noted the government had to make, "that forced marriage is a form of abuse that rises to the level of persecution."6 1 By
making it easier for women in forced marriages to assert a claim for
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Gao, 440 F.3d at 71-72.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 70.
In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357.
Gao, 440 F.3d at 66.
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asylum, the United States is open to an influx of women seeking asylum who were sold into marriage. The "on account of" language in
the Immigration and Nationality Act no longer receives the strict interpretation it was previously accorded.62
This "floodgates" argument may have merit, but it is not necessarily
a negative result. The fact that these women are sold like slaves with
no choice as to whom they marry seems to go to the very purpose of
asylum law. Asylum law in the United States gives refuge to those
whose "life or freedom" is threatened or not protected by their government.63 The inability of a person to choose not only whom he or
she will marry but also whether he or she will marry at all deals with
life and freedom. Being sold into marriage is a life-long deprivation of
choice, and the inability to choose the person to whom you will be
married takes away freedoms that the citizens of the United States
enjoy. These freedoms should be celebrated instead of cast aside as
casualties of a strict interpretation of elements that must be met. The
Second Circuit modified the way the question of who gets granted
asylum and who does not is answered, because the ramifications of
strictly interpreting regulations would lead to an immoral result.
Whether the court intended it or not, this is the result. The fact that
women in countries other than the United States, specifically China,
are sold into marriage is against the morals and values embodied in
the asylum law of the United States, regardless of whether the practice is a social norm in a foreign country.
V.

CONCLUSION

The decision in Gao v. Gonzales takes the three elements for asylum laid out in Fatin, which are (1) the person seeking asylum must
show that the "particular social group" exists; (2) that person is a
member of that group; and (3) there is a "well-founded fear" that the
person will be persecuted because they are a member of the group,64
and combines (2) and (3), making it less difficult for women who are
sold into marriage to prove that their membership in the "particular
social group" causes the persecution that they suffer. This decision
very well may lead to an influx of women seeking protection from
persecution, but morality must prevail in some instances, especially
those in which less fortunate people do not have their freedoms protected by their government. This decision takes asylum law a neces62. Gao, 440 F.3d at 68 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006)).
63. 8 C.F.R. 208.16(b)(1)(i) (2006) (addressing the standard for withholding of removal
under section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and withholding of removal
under the Convention Against Torture).
64. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.
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sary step closer to embracing morality and compassion rather than
strict red tape regulations. When the purpose of the law would be
served by one decision and the mold that the law has created equates
to an opposite decision, the law has and does change in order to serve
its purpose, as it did in Gao v. Gonzales.
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